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 The Lure of Authority:
 Motivation and Incentive Effects of Power1
 By Ernst Fehr, Holger Herz, and Tom Wilkening*
 Authority and power permeate political, social, and economic
 life, but empirical knowledge about the motivational origins and
 consequences of authority is limited. We study the motivation
 and incentive effects of authority experimentally in an authority
 delegation game. Individuals often retain authority even when its
 delegation is in their material interest—suggesting that authority has
 nonpecuniary consequences for utility. Authority also leads to over
 provision of effort by the controlling parties, while a large percentage
 of subordinates underprovide effort despite pecuniary incentives to
 the contrary. Authority thus has important motivational consequences
 that exacerbate the inefficiencies arising from suboptimal delegation
 choices. {JEL C92, D23, D82)(  , , )
 Authority and power play an important role in human societies. Influential schol
 ars from various social science disciplines—such as Marx (1867), Russell (1938),
 Parsons (1963), Dahl (1957), and Weber (1978)—have contributed to our under
 standing of the origins, characteristics, and potential consequences of these forces.
 Despite some notable early exceptions (Simon 1951; Zeuthen 1968; Harsanyi
 1971; Bowles and Gintis 1988), the study of authority and power has not been
 a major focus in economics. More recently, however, organizational economists
 have taken interest in the incentive effects of decision rights by studying situa
 tions where one party has the contractual right to make decisions that influence
 another party's payoffs and potential choices (Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart
 and Moore 1990; Aghion and Tirole 1997; Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy 1999;
 *Fehr: Department of Economics, Zurich University, Bluemlisalpstrasse 10, CH-8006 Zurich (e-mail: ernst.
 fehr@econ.uzh,ch); Herz: Department of Economics, Zurich University, Bluemlisalpstrasse 10, CH-8006
 Zurich (e-mail: holger.herz@econ.uzh.ch); Wilkening: Department of Economics, The University of Melbourne,
 Economics and Commerce Building, Victoria, 3010, Australia (e-mail: Tom.Wilkening@unimelb.edu.au). We are
 grateful to Sam Bowles, Wouter Dessein, Jon Elster, Bob Gibbons, Sergei Izmalkov, Bentley MacLeod, Nikos
 Nikiforakis, Klaus Schmidt, Chris Smith, seminar participants at the European University Institute in Florence,
 the London School of Economics, Bocconi, Harvard, MIT, NYU, Zurich, participants at the ESA International
 Meetings 2008 at Caltech, participants at the 24th annual congress of the European Economic Association, the sec
 ond Australian Workshop for Experimental Economics, the second Behavioral Economics Conference at Cornell,
 and three anonymous referees for helpful suggestions and feedback. We are particularly grateful to a fourth ref
 eree whose careful reading of our work greatly improved the article. We acknowledge the generous support of
 the Swiss National Science Foundation (Grant No. 100014_130127/1 on "The Social Dynamics of Normative
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 Dessein 2002; Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey 2004). The granting of decision rights
 can mitigate inefficiencies by shielding the controlling party from potential holdup
 and expropriation.
 There is, however, very little empirical work in economics that examines the
 behavioral consequences of authority and power or their motivational origins.
 This paper explores these forces using a laboratory experiment where we study
 how individuals manage and respond to authority in a hierarchical relationship.
 We propose a new "authority-delegation game" based on a model developed in
 Aghion and Tirole (1997). A principal and an agent must select one of a large
 number of potential projects for implementation. One party, initially the principal,
 has the right to decide which project to implement. The other party, initially the
 agent, can only make a project recommendation but lacks direct power to deter
 mine the project. We follow Aghion and Tirole (1997) by defining authority as the
 right to determine the project.
 Payoffs to the principal and agent for implementing a project are unknown ex ante,
 and both parties can provide effort which directly controls the probability with which
 they will be informed about the value of each project. One of the projects is best for
 the principal, while a different project is best for the agent. After the parties have
 exerted effort, four states are possible: both parties are informed, only the principal is
 informed, only the agent is informed, or neither party is informed. Before the parties
 provide effort, the principal can delegate authority to the agent and become the sub
 ordinate party. Delegation of authority means that the agent becomes the controlling
 party and has the right to choose the project.
 Both the controlling party (i.e., the party with the decision right) and the subordi
 nate party have pecuniary incentives to exert effort in this setup because both parties
 earn only a low outside option in the absence of any information. The subordinate's
 incentives are lower, however, because if both parties are informed, the control
 ling party may overrule the subordinate's proposal and choose the project which
 is best for him or her. Delegation therefore increases the agent's effort because he
 can now implement his preferred project in cases where he is informed. However,
 delegation also reduces the principal's control over project choice. When the princi
 pal's return from the agent's preferred project is high, the cost of losing authority is
 small. A rational principal who maximizes her expected payoff should thus delegate
 authority in this case. When a principal's return from the agent's preferred project
 is low, however, the cost of losing authority is high, and a rational principal who
 maximizes expected payoff should retain authority.
 Our first main result is that the principals show a proclivity for retaining author
 ity in situations in which they could improve their expected income by delegating
 it, i.e., in situations in which their return from the agent's preferred project is rela
 tively high. However, the principals delegate only in roughly 40 percent of these
 cases. Pessimistic expectations about the agent's effort in case of delegation can
 not explain this reluctance. On the contrary, the principals have quite reasonable
 beliefs about the agent's effort, meaning that it would be profitable to delegate in
 the clear majority of cases based on these beliefs. Nevertheless, principals prefer
 retaining authority.
 These findings suggest that the principals might view authority not just as an
 instrument that helps them increase their earnings, but that the allocation of decision
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 rights has nonpecuniary consequences that inhibit the delegation of authority.1 In
 our experiment, the fact that the principals are willing to sacrifice some of their earn
 ings to keep authority suggests a preference for the decision right.
 Why are the principals willing to forgo money in order to keep the decision right?
 Our empirical data indicate that a disutility for being overruled appears to be an
 important driver behind their reluctance to delegate. A principal is overruled if
 (i) she delegates authority and (ii) both the principal and the agent are informed
 about project values so that (iii) the agent can disregard the principal's information
 and choose his preferred project. Note that the principal's pecuniary payoff from the
 agent's preferred project is the same regardless of whether the principal is informed
 about the project values or not. Conditional on effort, an expected utility maximiz
 ing principal who is the subordinate of an informed agent should thus be indifferent
 between the case where she is informed and overruled by the agent and the case
 where she remains uninformed. It follows that her behavior after being informed,
 overruled, and receiving the payoff from the agent's preferred project should be
 identical to her behavior after being uninformed and receiving the same payoff.
 If, however, a principal experiences a nonpecuniary disutility from being over
 ruled, her behavior after these two outcomes may differ: the principal may be less
 willing to delegate in the next period if overruled. This is exactly what we find in our
 data. Principals who are overruled are significantly less likely to delegate in the next
 period relative to those who are uninformed, even if it is in their pecuniary interest
 to delegate. Moreover, we observe significantly higher delegation rates in a con
 trol treatment where delegation is profitable and the principal cannot be overruled
 after delegation (because she always remains uninformed) relative to a treatment
 in which the profitability of delegation is larger but the principal can be overruled.
 Thus, a disutility from being overruled appears to be an important nonpecuniary
 factor behind the reluctance to delegate.
 Our second main finding is that the controlling party substantially overprovides
 effort relative to the Nash equilibrium and relative to his or her best response to the
 subordinate party's anticipated effort. This overprovision is persistent, with no con
 vergence to the Nash equilibrium over time. Being in the position of the controlling
 party thus generates additional motivation for effort provision.
 Our third main finding is that many subordinates substantially underprovide effort
 relative to the Nash equilibrium. In fact, a substantial minority of the subordinate
 parties (between 30 and 50 percent across various treatments) chooses a zero effort
 level even though—due to the very small cost of low positive effort levels—zero
 effort is almost never an optimal choice. This result suggests that the lack of author
 ity has a demotivating effect on a substantial minority of the subordinate parties.
 It turns out that many aspects of our data can be captured by the notion that
 subjects want to avoid ex post regret about their choices—a hypothesis that was
 introduced by Loomes and Sugden (1982). Regret aversion is a form of reference
 dependent utility and is based on the idea that subjects derive disutility from regret
 1 Psychologists have postulated a preference for power (Mulder 1975) or a preference for agency, autonomy, and
 self-determination (Rotter 1966; deCharms 1968; Deci 1981). To our knowledge, however, no evidence yet exists
 that demonstrates a willingness to pay (i.e., a preference) for power, agency, or autonomy.
This content downloaded from 134.21.139.233 on Mon, 19 Feb 2018 10:56:33 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 1328  THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW  JUNE 2013
 that arises by comparing their actual ex post outcomes with those the subject could
 have had by choosing a different action.
 A distaste for ex post regret can explain our underdelegation result in the follow
 ing manner:2 the principals exert strictly less effort throughout the experiment as
 a subordinate (i.e., after delegation) than they did as the controlling party. Thus, a
 principal who delegates and is informed in the role of a subordinate would also have
 been informed as the controlling party.3 As being overruled leads to a project with a
 lower value to the principal, a principal who delegates and is informed and overruled
 may regret her delegation choice ex post, because if she had kept her decision right
 she could have chosen her preferred project. Anticipating such regret, an individual
 may maintain control in order to mitigate the potential for regret. Moreover, a prin
 cipal who has delegated can minimize feelings of regret by minimizing the probabil
 ity of being informed, i.e., by choosing a zero effort. Thus, the desire to avoid regret
 can explain both the propensity for underdelegation and the low effort choices of the
 subordinates.4 Finally, regret may analogously generate the overprovision of effort
 by the controlling parties if they experience regret when they remain uninformed
 because the right to choose the project is of little value in this case. We discuss the
 evidence in favor of regret aversion in more detail in Section IIIB, Section IIIE, and
 online Appendix A.
 Our article is related to the experimental literature on the consequences of del
 egation on punishment choices (Bartling and Fischbacher 2012, Coffman 2011).
 While these papers study the assignment of punishment in response to the alloca
 tion choices of either a principal or a delegate, our article studies the willingness
 of the principal to delegate and the willingness of a principal and an agent to invest
 effort in response to the assignment of decision rights. Our results on effort pro
 vision are also related to the literature on the hidden costs of control (Fehr and
 Rockenbach 2003; Fehr and List 2004; Falk and Kosfeld 2006; Charness et al.
 2012). While this literature shows that the exercise of control reduces an individu
 al's positive reciprocity towards the principal, our article shows that lack of control
 has demotivating consequences on subordinates that induce them to act against
 their material self-interest.
 We believe that our results have potentially important implications across many
 domains. In relation to the property rights literature (Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart
 and Moore 1990), (re) allocating property rights across firms may be difficult if deci
 sion rights have nonpecuniary consequences for utility because organization mem
 bers with decision rights may oppose their reallocation, even if they would benefit
 economically from it. The underdelegation of authority not only reduces the prin
 cipals' earnings, but also causes the agent to lose money in some of our treatments.
 2 For further details see online Appendix A where we apply a formal model of regret aversion to our experiment.
 'Effort in the experiment is identical to the probability of becoming informed about the value of each project.
 Each party's effort is a number in the set {0,5,..., 100}; this effort is compared to a random number equally distrib
 uted between 1 and 100. If the random number is equal or below the effort of the party, the party was informed about
 the value of all projects; if the random number is above the effort of the party, the party remained uninformed. Thus,
 if the principal's effort as a controlling party is higher than her effort as a subordinate party, then being informed as
 a subordinate party implies that the principal also would have been informed as a controlling party.
 "Note that regret can affect not only principals, but also agents in the subordinate role. The agents' efforts might
 be wasted even if they are informed, since in cases where the principal is also informed, the agent will be overruled.
 In these cases, agents may regret positive effort levels ex post. Therefore, regret averse agents in the subordinate role
 may reduce effort relative to an agent that maximizes his or her expected earnings.
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 Thus, the distortion in the allocation of control rights can lead to organizational
 structures that reduce the value of the organization as a whole. The identification of
 motivational obstacles to delegation adds an important component to the theoreti
 cal work by Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1999), Sliwka (2001), and Bester and
 Krahmer (2008), which predicts limits to delegation in environments with limited
 commitment, dynamic incentives, or limited liability.
 A reluctance to delegate decision rights may also play a role in corporate finance,
 in the political sphere, and in the design of optimal institutions for regulating rela
 tions between firms. Models of empire-building investment (Jensen 1986, Hart and
 Moore 1995), which have been used extensively in the literature to understand the
 trade-offs between financial instruments, may, in part, be founded on nonpecuni
 ary motives to retain authority. In view of incumbents' advantages for reelection
 (Gelman and King 1990), these motives also strengthen the case for term limits
 because politicians may otherwise try to keep their political power positions beyond
 what is good for the polity. In addition, they may provide a rationale for models in
 the spirit of Niskanen ( 1971 ) which assume that bureaucrats seek to maximize their
 discretionary budget.
 The motivational consequences of authority for effort provision may be equally
 important. The motivation enhancing effect for the controlling parties and the detri
 mental effect on the motivation of a large minority of the subordinates suggest that
 the incentive effects of authority are larger than the standard model predicts: a real
 location of authority may cause a marked increase in effort by the new controlling
 party and a large reduction in effort by the party previously in control. The note
 worthy gap between the controlling and the subordinate parties' efforts also implies
 that when contracts are incomplete, the efficiency losses due to authority are likely
 to be higher than the standard model predicts. Furthermore, our finding that a lack
 of authority seems to demotivate only a minority of people suggests that putting the
 right people into positions that lack authority is important. The development of tools
 for detecting this type of employee may thus be important in minimizing the cost
 associated with the (re) allocation of authority.
 Despite the systematic deviations from the predictions of the Aghion and Tirole
 (1997) model, we believe that their model is very useful for the study of authority
 because the main comparative static predictions of the model are nicely met, and
 the precise numerical predictions of the model enabled us to detect the motivational
 forces we described above. The model is thus incomplete in terms of the underlying
 motivational forces, but the (incomplete) model is remarkably robust in terms of
 the comparative static predictions. It remains to be seen whether this robustness is
 a general feature of the broader organizational economics literature where commu
 nication (Dessein 2002, Rantakari 2008), monetary incentives (Athey and Roberts
 2001), and dynamic learning (Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey 2004) are possible.
 However, even if the robustness of the comparative static predictions of the Aghion
 and Tirole model extends to the broader organizational economics literature, we
 believe that this literature should take the behavioral forces observed in our paper
 into account because—as we show here—they may have important consequences.
 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We present a simplified ver
 sion of the model of Aghion and Tirole (1997) in Section I and derive its theo
 retical predictions. Section II details our experimental design and hypotheses.
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 Section III reports the main results of our experiment and is separated into three
 parts. Section IIIA summarizes the data and provides an overview of the major
 results. Section IIIB explores possible reasons why principals might choose to keep
 control rights. The third part, consisting of Sections IIIC-IIIE, examines the rea
 sons for the controlling parties' overprovision of effort and why subordinate par
 ties might want to underprovide effort relative to the risk neutral Nash equilibrium.
 Section IV concludes.
 I. Theoretical Motivations
 The basis of our experimental design is a model of authority developed in Aghion
 and Tirole (1997). We consider a world in which a principal (she) and an agent (he)
 are organized in a hierarchical structure and must decide to implement one or zero
 projects out of a set of n > 3 potential projects. With each project k € {1,...,«},
 there is an associated noncontractible gain of Pk for the principal and a private ben
 efit Ak for the agent. If no project is implemented, the profit and private value are
 both equal to a known outside value of P0 and A0, respectively.
 For ease of exposition, we index the principal's preferred project by 1 and the
 agent's preferred project by 2. The principal's preferred project yields known profit
 P1 to the principal and Ax to the agent where P, > P0 and A{ > A0. Likewise, the
 agent's preferred project yields known benefit P2 to the principal and A2 to the agent
 with A2 > A0 and P2 > Pq- As their name suggests, the principal's preferred proj
 ect yields a strictly higher value to the principal than the agent's preferred project
 OP, > Pi). Likewise, the agent's preferred project yields strictly higher value to the
 agent than the principal's preferred project {A2> Ax).
 While the potential values of projects are known, all projects look identical
 ex ante and information must be collected in order to differentiate between them.
 The principal and agent acquire information in a binary form. At private cost gA(e),
 the agent learns his payoffs to all candidate projects with probability e. With prob
 ability 1 — e, the agent learns nothing and cannot differentiate between the projects.
 Similarly, at private cost gP(E), the principal becomes perfectly informed about the
 payoffs of all projects with probability E and learns nothing with probability 1 — E.
 Effort choices are made simultaneously and privately. We concentrate on the case
 where gA(e) and gP(E) are quadratic, #a(0) = gp(0) = ~ gp(l) < 0, and
 A2 — #a(1) < 0. These assumptions ensure that the reaction functions are linear
 and that a unique interior solution exists for both authority allocations.5
 We consider a four-stage game which relates decision rights, incentive conflict,
 and effort. In the first stage, the principal decides whether to keep decision rights or
 to delegate them to the agent. In the second stage, both parties privately and simul
 taneously gather information about the n projects' payoffs. In the third stage, the
 subordinate recommends a project to the controlling party. Finally, the controlling
 party implements a project or the outside option on the basis of his information and
 the information communicated by the subordinate.
 5 In the experiment, we also use a discrete effort space to reduce cognitive burden. All predictions in Section IIB
 are relative to the restricted effort space.
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 We assume that the principal and agent are risk neutral. For a given effort level
 and implemented project k, the principal's utility is Pk — gP{E). The agent's utility
 is — gA{e). As outcomes and effort choices are noncontractible, performance- or
 outcome-contingent payments are ruled out and the introduction of wages is neces
 sary only to satisfy the agent's participation constraint, which, to avoid further nota
 tion, we assume to be satisfied.
 Information in the model is soft so that information passed between parties cannot
 be verified. As such, if one party is informed and the other party is uninformed, the
 informed party can limit the amount of information given to the other party. As there
 is always an incentive conflict between the parties and outcomes are noncontract
 ible, there is always an incentive to restrict information to the preferred project of
 the informed individual. It follows that communication between parties is reduced
 to a recommendation for a single project choice.
 We denote the party that has authority as the controlling party, while the party
 without authority is called the subordinate. For each party, the expected value for
 selecting a project at random is less than their respective outside option. Thus, under
 the assumption of risk neutrality or risk aversion, the subordinate prefers to recom
 mend the outside option rather than a random project. Similarly, an uninformed
 controlling party never chooses unilaterally to undertake a project other than the
 outside option.
 Given that A2 > Ax > A0, > P2 > Pq, and information is soft, the subordinate
 always has an incentive to recommend his or her preferred project to the control
 ling party. The controlling party has an incentive to follow this recommendation if
 uninformed and to overrule the project and implement his or her preferred project
 if informed. It follows that if the principal keeps control, the utilities of a risk
 neutral principal and agent are
 A. Analysis and Theoretical Implications
 (2)
 (1)  EVP = EPX + (1 - E)eP2 + P0 - gP(E),
 EVA = EÂi + (1 - E)eA2 + A0 - gA(e),
 where
 (3)  Pi=Pi-P0, for i G {1,2},
 (4)  A, = Ai — A0, for i G {1,2}.
 If the agent receives control, the utility of the principal and agent are
 (6)
 (5)  EVdP = (1 - e)EP] + eP2 + P0 - gP(E),
 EVdA = (1 - e)EÂx + eÂ2 + A0 - gA(e),
 where the superscript d denotes the expected payoffs in the delegation case.
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 From equations (1) and (2), the reaction functions if the principal keeps control
 are the solutions to the following first-order conditions:
 (V) A - eP2 = g'P{E),
 (8) (1 - E)A2 = g'A(e).
 Equation (7) describes the principal's reaction function which we denote by rP(e).
 Equation (8) describes the agent's reaction function denoted by rA{E). Note that
 both rP(e) and rA(E) are downward sloping in (E, e)-space, implying that the princi
 pal's and agent's effort level are strategic substitutes. Thus, an increase in the agent's
 effort induces the principal to reduce her effort and vice versa. By the additional
 assumptions placed on gP(E) and gA(e) above, the reaction functions are also linear,
 and there exists an interior intersection of reaction functions, (eNE, ENE), which con
 stitutes the Nash equilibrium of this subgame.
 If the agent receives control, the reaction curves of the principal and agent are the
 solutions to:
 (9) (1 -e)Px=g'P{E),
 (10) Â2 - EAX = g'A(e),
 and denoted by rP(ed) and rA{Ed). As in the case when the principal keeps control,
 the reaction functions are downward sloping in (Ed, ed) space. Our uniqueness
 criteria assumed above again ensure the existence of an interior intersection
 j NE jNE
 of reaction functions, (e ,E ), which constitutes the Nash equilibrium of
 this subgame.
 A careful examination of the reaction functions if the principal keeps control and
 if the agent receives control reveals that the principal decreases her effort when giv
 ing up control, while the agent increases his effort. Delegation thus has two effects
 on the principal's payoff: (i) a cost saving effect since delegation reduces the equi
 librium effort of the principal and increases the agent's equilibrium effort, and
 (11) a project selection effect which decreases the probability that the principal's
 preferred project is undertaken. As these effects are, in general, of opposite sign,
 the overall incentive for delegation depends on the specifics of the cost function
 and the degree of interest alignment. In our experiment, we chose cost functions and
 parameters such that the magnitude of P2 determines whether delegation or retention
 is optimal for the principal. Full details of the experimental design and its param
 eterizations are discussed in more detail in the next section.
 II. The Experiment
 A. The Authority Game
 At the center of our experimental design is a computerized authority-delegation
 game with the following features. In each of ten periods, a principal is matched with
 an agent and shown a set of 36 cards on her computer screen representing potential
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 Figure 1. Experimental Procedures in the Authority Game
 projects.6 One of these cards has a small positive payoff for both players and is
 placed face up representing the outside option. The remaining 35 cards are shuffled
 face down so that the location of each project is unknown. One of these cards is red
 and represents the principal's preferred project. Following the theory section, we
 refer to this card as Project 1. A second card is blue and represents the agent's pre
 ferred project. We refer to this card as Project 2. The remaining 33 cards are white
 and result in zero payoff for both parties. The task of each principal-agent pair is to
 select a card which will be used for payment. The payoffs ensure that individuals
 prefer to implement the outside option relative to picking a card at random.
 Play of the game is done in six stages which are illustrated in Figure 1 and dis
 cussed here. Initially principals are given the decision right which corresponds to
 being able to select a card at the end of the game. In the first stage of the game, each
 principal is asked whether he wishes to keep this right or to transfer the right to the
 agent. Giving the right to the agent is binding and irreversible.
 In the second stage, subjects choose their effort levels simultaneously and in
 private.7 Both subjects select their effort in increments of five from {0, 5,..., 95, 100}.
 This effort corresponds to the probability that the subject learns the location of all
 projects. Effort has an associated cost generated via a quadratic cost function which
 is constant across treatments and player types:
 (u> = 25(w)3'
 Subjects are presented information on the cost of effort in a table where each pos
 sible effort and its associated cost is displayed. In all but one session, agents' effort
 levels are recorded via the strategy method where an effort level is elicited both for
 the case where principals keep decision rights and the case where these rights are
 6Subjects are randomly assigned the role of a principal or of an agent and remain in this role throughout the
 experiment. In the instructions, they were referred to as participant A and participant B.
 7 In the experiment we refer to effort as "search intensity."
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 delegated.8 Thus, agents choose their effort levels before they know whether the
 principal has delegated authority to them.
 In the third stage, we elicit beliefs of both subjects. Principals and agents are
 asked their beliefs about the effort of the other party both in the case where decision
 rights are kept and where they are delegated. For principals this is done in two steps.
 Beliefs are first elicited for the chosen authority assignment followed by beliefs for
 the counterfactual. For agents, beliefs for both potential authority assignments are
 elicited simultaneously. To prevent hedging, no incentives are used in the elicitation
 of beliefs. In the fourth stage, agents are informed about whether principals kept or
 transferred decision rights. Then, given a subject's effort for the principal's assign
 ment of authority, a random process determines whether that subject learns the pay
 offs of all projects or whether he stays uninformed. The effort of the other subject is
 not revealed, nor is information indicating the success or failure of the other subject's
 effort. All information gained at this stage is private.
 In the fifth stage, the subordinate is given the ability to recommend a project to
 the controlling party. This is accomplished by visibly marking a single project on
 the computer screen, which can include the outside option. The recommendation is
 shown to the controlling party, but the payoffs associated with the recommended
 project are kept hidden in the case where the controlling party remains uninformed.
 In the final stage, after seeing the recommendation of the subordinate and the
 information from his own effort, the controlling party selects a project. Payment
 for the round is based on the selected project and the costs of effort of each subject.
 B. Experimental Design and Hypotheses
 The experimental design involves four treatments implemented in a between-sub
 jects design. Treatments vary in the amount that principals and agents are paid for
 the selection of the project preferred by the other party (P2 and A,). By changing
 the payoff given to the other party, the level of incentive conflict in the environment
 is changed, which, as indicated by the first-order conditions in Section IA, leads to
 differences in predicted delegation and effort levels.
 Table 1 summarizes the value of projects across the four treatments. In each treat
 ment, each party earns 40 points for the selection of his preferred project and a
 smaller amount for the other party's preferred project. Treatments are divided into
 two groups—symmetric and asymmetric—where symmetry refers to the relative
 values of P2 and Ax. In the symmetric treatments (LOW and HIGH) the payoffs
 from the other party's preferred project are the same for the principal and agent. In
 the low alignment treatment (LOW), the payoffs from the other party's preferred
 project are small (20) leading to a high degree of incentive conflict. In the high
 alignment treatment (HIGH), the payoffs from the other party's preferred project are
 8 We test whether the strategy method influences our results by comparing the results of three sessions of the
 HIGH treatment where the strategy method was run (N — 70) to the session of the HIGH treatment where a stan
 dard elicitation method was used (N = 30). We find no difference across treatments. The p- values of a Kolmogorov
 Smirnov test, which tests whether the distribution of agent effort is identical in treatments with and without strategy
 method, are 0.79 for effort with decision rights and 0.81 for effort without decision rights. Delegation frequencies
 differ by 1.6 percent. This difference is also not significant (p — 0.71 in a Fisher's exact test). The data from the
 treatments using the strategy method are therefore pooled with the data from treatments using the standard elicita
 tion method in the subsequent analysis.
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 Table 1—Overview of Project Payoffs
 Project 1
 Principal  Agent
 Project 2
 Principal  Agent
 Outside
 option
 Other
 projects
 PLOW  40  35  20  40  10  0
 LOW  40  20  20  40  10  0
 HIGH  40  35  35  40  10  0
 PHIGH  40  20  35  40  10  0
 Table 2—Predicted Effort Levels and Expected Profits
 Principal has control Agent has control
 Ene  evP  eva  ed"E  e*"E  evdP  evdA  Delegation?
 PLOW  55  25  20.1  25.6  35  45  17.2  23.3  No
 LOW  55  25  20.1  17.3  25  55  17.3  20.1  No
 HIGH  45  35  23.3  24.0  35  45  24.0  23.3  Yes
 PHIGH  45  35  23.3  17.2  25  55  25.6  20.1  Yes
 Notes: ENE^and E'1'" denote Nash equilibrium predictions for the principal depending on the control allocation.
 eNE and ed denote Nash equilibrium predictions for the agent depending on the control allocation. EVP, and
 EVp denote expected equilibrium profits for the principal depending on the control allocation. EVA and EVdA denote
 expected equilibrium profits for the agent depending on the control allocation.
 large (35) leading to less incentive conflict. In the asymmetric treatments (PLOW
 and PHIGH), the payoffs from the other party's preferred project are large for one
 of the two parties (35) and small for the other (20). As a naming convention, we
 use PHIGH to denote the case where the principal's value is high under the agent's
 preferred project. The PLOW treatment is the case where the principal's value is low
 under the agent's preferred project.
 Table 2 shows the predicted Nash equilibrium effort levels and expected profits
 for each treatment under the case where authority is kept and transferred. As in the
 model developed in Section I, E represents the effort level of the principal, while e
 represents the effort level of the agent. As can be seen in Table 2, the LOW treat
 ment has a high degree of incentive conflict, and authority should be kept by the
 principal, because the principal's expected profit if she keeps control, EVP, is 20.1,
 while the expected payoff if she delegates control, EVdP, is only 17.3. In the HIGH
 treatment, incentive conflict is reduced, and the principal should delegate authority
 (EVP = 23.3 versus EVdP = 24.0)9.
 In the asymmetric treatments the rewards to delegation are either exacerbated
 or further diminished relative to the symmetric treatments. Of the four treatments,
 principals are predicted to have the highest expected value from delegation in the
 PHIGH treatment (EVdP — 25.6) and the lowest expected value from delegation in
 the PLOW treatment (EVP = 17.2).
 In addition to the delegation predictions, the different interest alignments also
 lead to different predictions with regard to equilibrium effort levels. All point pre
 dictions are given in Table 2. Note that the delegation decisions predicted by the
 9 As will be shown below, while the difference in theoretical expected value is small, the empirical difference
 turns out to be large.
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 Nash equilibrium are always in the set of welfare maximizing delegation choices.
 In the PLOW treatment, aggregate expected earnings EVp + EVA are highest if the
 principal keeps authority, while in the PHIGH treatment aggregate expected earn
 ings are highest if the principal delegates authority. In the symmetric treatments,
 LOW and HIGH, the delegation decision has no effect on the overall welfare if
 subjects choose Nash equilibrium effort levels.
 In the experiment described above, the delegation decision of the principal and
 the joint effort decisions of the principal and agent generate one of many potential
 compound lotteries. If an individual's preferences are reference dependent (as, e.g.,
 stipulated in regret theory), the individual's preferred action profile may depart from
 the equilibrium action profile which assumes players are expected value maximiz
 es. In order to control for such heterogeneity in preferences, we ran a lottery task
 and used choices from this lottery task as a proxy for the degree to which a subject's
 preferences exhibit reference dependence. In the lottery task, each subject is pre
 sented with the opportunity to participate in six different lotteries with payoffs in
 Swiss francs, each having the following form:
 Win CHF 6 with probability y, lose CHF X with probability y.
 If subjects reject the lottery they receive CHF 0.
 The six lotteries varied in the amount X, that could be lost, where X took on the
 values X G {2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}. One of the six gambles was randomly selected and
 paid. As these lotteries are binary, any reference dependent utility function with a
 reference point between the lowest and the highest outcome can lead to a rejection
 of gambles with X < 6. In particular, individuals who are regret averse and compare
 their outcome to the action which is optimal ex post will reject actuarially fair gam
 bles. Thus, the amount X at which a subject starts rejecting the lottery can therefore
 be taken as an indicator of the degree to which a subject's preference exhibits refer
 ence dependence, such as, e.g., regret aversion. For example, a subject who rejects
 all lotteries with a potential loss of X > 3 is classified as exhibiting more regret
 aversion than a subject who rejects only all lotteries with a potential loss of X > 5.10
 In principle, the rejection of actuarially fair gambles in the lottery choice task
 may also reflect a subject's loss or risk aversion. However, in Section HIE and the
 online Appendices D and E we show that loss and risk aversion have little explana
 tory power with regard to effort choices, while regret aversion can rationalize both
 the controlling parties' overprovision of effort and the preference for extremely low
 (i.e., zero) effort levels among the subordinates.11
 l0One hundred forty-three out of 150 subjects who participated in the lottery task and played the authority
 delegation game in one of our main treatments have a unique switching point. We use the accepted gamble with
 the largest potential loss as the independent variable when using the lottery task and do not exclude subjects in the
 analysis. Excluding subjects with multiple switching points does not significantly alter any of our results.
 11 Moreover, it has been shown by Rabin (2000) that the rejection of lotteries for X < 6 cannot be reconciled
 with the assumption that utility is a (reference-independent) strictly concave function of total wealth. Risk aversion
 based on concave utility of wealth at such low-stake levels would imply unreasonable levels of risk aversion at
 higher stakes, which makes risk averse behavior in this task incompatible with expected utility theory.
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 Thus, if regret aversion is a motive behind subjects' rejection of lotteries in
 the lottery task, then the propensity to reject lotteries should also be a predictor
 of subjects' effort level as a controlling party and the tendency to provide zero
 effort as a subordinate party. Likewise, if regret aversion is a motive behind both
 the propensity to reject lotteries and the reluctance to delegate, then we should
 observe a correlation between the two phenomena. The lottery task may thus
 provide further evidence regarding the motivational forces behind effort and del
 egation choices.
 C. Procedures
 Typically, between 20 and 30 subjects participated in each experimental session
 which consisted of three parts.12 In part one, subjects played seven periods of a
 single-player version of the authority game. This single-player game is identical to
 the authority game except that there is no second party. Subjects choose an effort
 and receive information probabilistically based on their effort. Each individual must
 then select a project based solely on his own information. The selected project does
 not affect the payoff of a second party, nor does a second party recommend a project.
 This single-player variant gives subjects a chance to get familiar with the effort cost
 schedule and the computer program.
 In part two, the subjects are divided into matching groups of ten subjects consist
 ing of five principals and five agents. Subjects play ten periods of the main authority
 game in one of the four treatments. Subjects are informed that in a new period they
 would be matched with another randomly chosen partner.
 In part three, subjects are asked to take a short questionnaire in which demo
 graphic information is recorded. Instructions for the experiment include a control
 quiz and a verbal summary of the authority game.
 Our subject pool consisted primarily of students at Zurich University and the
 Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich.13 The first series of experiments took
 place in May and June 2007 with a second series of experiments conducted in May
 and October 2008. Further control experiments were conducted in May 2009 and
 April 2011.14 In total, 504 subjects participated in the experiment, divided into
 17 sessions. Experiments were computerized using the software z-tree (Fischbacher
 2007). Payment was given for each period of the main authority game, for the last
 five periods of the single-player game, and for one randomly chosen gamble from
 the lottery task. On average, an experimental session of the main treatments lasted
 one hour with an average payment of 33.5 CHF ($35.00).15
 12More details on individual sessions is provided in online Appendix B.
 13 Subjects were drawn from a database of volunteers using the Online Recruitment System for Economic
 Experiments (Greiner 2004).
 l4See also online Appendix B.
 15 Some of the control treatments had 25 or 50 periods and therefore lasted longer. Additional information on
 these treatments is given in Section IIIB.
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 III. Experimental Results
 A. The Main Facts
 Our experimental design generates predictions with regard to delegation, effort,
 and project choices. With regard to project choices and project recommendations the
 theory does very well:
 RESULT 1: Controlling parties who are informed about the project valuations
 almost always choose their preferred projects, implying that they overrule the sub
 ordinates' recommendations. Informed subordinates almost always recommend
 their preferred project, and uninformed controlling parties almost always imple
 ment this recommendation.
 Result 1 is supported by the following numbers. Principals (Agents) in the
 role of controlling parties who were informed implemented their preferred proj
 ect in 100 percent (97.3 percent) of the cases. Principals (agents) in the role of the
 informed subordinate party recommended their preferred project in 92.6 percent
 (92.5 percent) of the cases. Finally, principals (agents) in the role of the uninformed
 controlling party followed the subordinate party's recommendation in 94.1 percent
 (96.5 percent) of the cases. If the subordinate parties were not informed they typically
 recommended the outside option (principals: 95.3 percent; agents: 97.0 percent).
 Result 1 indicates that the controlling parties used the decision right in their favor.
 As predicted by theory, this generates a disincentive for subordinates' effort provi
 sion, but it also makes it reasonable for the principals to delegate authority if their
 payoff loss at the agents' preferred project is low. Therefore, we next turn to the
 principals' delegation choices. Recall that in case of Nash equilibrium effort choices
 by the principal and agent, the principal has an incentive to delegate authority in the
 HIGH and PHIGH treatments and to keep authority in the LOW and PLOW treat
 ments. Empirically, we find in our experiment:
 RESULT 2: (i) When the principals' interests are misaligned with the agent (LOW
 and PLOW) such that the principals are predicted to keep authority, delegation
 decisions are close to the equilibrium predictions. (ii) When the principals' inter
 ests are strongly aligned with the agent (HIGH and PHIGH treatments) such that
 principals should delegate, we observe strong underdelegation of authority relative
 to the equilibrium predictions.
 Figure 2 shows the frequency of delegation for each treatment graphically. As can
 be seen on the left-hand side of the figure, delegation rates in the PLOW and LOW
 treatments are 16.3 percent and 13.9 percent. While these levels are above the pre
 dicted level of zero, deviations from the prediction appear to be due to infrequent
 experimentation rather than heterogeneity in delegation strategies. There is little per
 sistence in the strategy of delegation, with 67.4 percent of individuals who delegated
 authority in one period switching to keeping authority in the next. The frequency of
 delegation for most individuals is also low, with 39.4 percent of individuals choosing
 to never delegate and 89.4 percent of individuals delegating in three periods or less.
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 Figure 2. Delegation Frequencies by Alignment
 Average delegation rates in the HIGH and PHIGH treatment are 35.5 percent and
 42.7 percent, far below the predicted rate of 100 percent. These low delegation rates
 are also rather stable over time. In the HIGH treatment the overall delegation rate is
 33.5 percent in the first five periods and 37.5 percent in periods six through ten. In
 the PHIGH treatment the overall delegation rate is 36.7 percent in the first five peri
 ods and stabilizes around 48.7 percent from period six onwards.16
 In contrast to the LOW and PLOW treatments, the underdelegation of authority in
 the HIGH and PHIGH treatments appears to be due to heterogeneity in delegation
 strategies across individuals. Less than 20 percent of individuals delegate eight or
 more times in the experiment, and individuals who delegate in one period are more
 likely to delegate in the next period, suggesting some persistence in the delegation
 strategy. However, even in the PHIGH treatment in which delegation incentives are
 highest according to the Nash prediction, 40 percent of individuals have a delega
 tion frequency of zero, suggesting that underdelegation is rather pervasive.
 One possible reason for the observed underdelegation might be that actual effort pro
 vision if the principal keeps control compared to the case in which the agent receives
 control makes it more profitable to keep authority. Table 3, which shows the realized
 profits of principals who kept and delegated authority, shows that this is not the case.
 In the HIGH and PHIGH treatments, realized profits for the principal are lower than
 predicted if she keeps control and higher than predicted if the agent receives control.
 Principals who delegate have on average 30.4 percent greater earnings in the HIGH
 treatment and 44.5 percent greater earnings in the PHIGH treatment.
 16While the difference in delegation rates between the first and second half of the experiment is insignificant for
 the HIGH treatment, the difference of 12 percentage points in the PHIGH treatment is significant (p < 0.01 in a
 probit regression of delegation on a dummy for periods 6-10). We also ran a 50 period session to test for potential
 long-run learning effects. While delegation increased over the first 20 periods, under-delegation was still pervasive.
 See Section IIIB for details.
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 Table 3—Realized Profits and Predicted Equilibrium Profits for Principals
 Principal has control
 Observations
 Agent has control
 Observations Actual  Predicted  Actual  Predicted
 PLOW  18.3*  20.1  251  17.6  17.2  49
 LOW  19.0  20.1  310  15.0**  17.3  50
 HIGH  19 I***  23.3  316  24.9  24.0  174
 PHIGH  18.4***  23.3  172  26.6  25.6  128
 Notes: Significance levels calculated by regressing earnings on a constant and testing whether the constant is equal
 to the prediction. Errors clustered at the individual level.
 *** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
 * Significant at the 10 percent level.
 The second main hypothesis of the experiment is about effort provision. In theory,
 an incentive conflict leads the controlling party to put in more effort than would be
 optimal in the case of contractible effort and causes the subordinate to put in less.
 Relative to this Nash equilibrium benchmark, we observe
 RESULT 3: Controlling parties provide an excess of effort relative to the Nash equi
 librium. Subordinates underprovide effort relative to the Nash equilibrium.
 Figure 3 plots the average deviation of effort levels from the predicted equilibrium
 values by the principal and agent with both means and 95 percent confidence inter
 vals calculated from individual average efforts. It can be seen that, when authority
 is kept, the principal overprovides and the agent underprovides relative to the pre
 diction. This phenomenon is reversed, again in all treatments, when authority is
 delegated, and these deviations are significant for the majority of treatments.17 In
 the low treatment, for example, the principal overprovides effort by roughly ten
 units relative to the prediction if she keeps control, while the agent underprovides
 effort by about ten units. This deviation pattern is reversed when the agent is the
 controlling party.
 The deviations in effort levels from the equilibrium prediction cause inefficiencies
 that are reflected in the low actual payoff levels of the principals and the agents rela
 tive to the predicted payoff levels. Table 3 shows that the principals earn less than
 predicted in five out of eight cases. In particular, if control is kept, which occurs
 most frequently in all treatments, the principals always earn less than predicted.
 For the agents the income loss relative to the prediction is even more extreme (see
 Table 4): in all eight cases they earn on average less than predicted.
 The combined effect of underdelegation and deviations in effort provision has
 particularly strong pecuniary consequences in the PHIGH treatment. Unlike the
 other treatments, delegation in this treatment lead both the principal and agent to be
 better off in expectation relative to held control. Principals who delegate receive 45
 percent more income compared to those who hold on to decision rights. Likewise
 agents who are left as the subordinate receive 13.8 percent less profit than those who
 17We report results from a nonparametric Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test in Table CI of online Appendix C.
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 Figure 3. Deviations from Equilibrium Effort Predictions
 Notes: The vertical axis shows the difference (£) between the principal's observed effort (E) and the Nash equilib
 rium effort (Ene). The horizontal axis shows the difference (ë) between the agent's observed effort (e) and the Nash
 equilibrium effort (eNE). Ninety-five percent confidence intervals and mean effort calculated at the individual level.
 are delegated to. Taken together, in PHIGH the welfare loss of keeping authority
 amounts to 30 percent in terms of expected income.18 The loss in aggregate payoff
 due to the deviations from the Nash equilibrium are not restricted to PHIGH, how
 ever. Table C2 in online Appendix C shows that both the principals and the agents
 earn less than in the Nash equilibrium in each of the four treatments. We summarize
 these findings in the following result:
 RESULT 4: In each treatment, the deviation in effort provision and delegation leads
 to monetary losses for both parties relative to the Nash equilibrium. Monetary losses
 are most acute in the PHIGH treatment where delegation would lead to higher aver
 age earnings for both parties.
 18The implicit assumption in this calculation is that if the principals who kept control rights were to delegate
 instead, they would exert effort similar to those who delegated. If the principal were to exert less effort, the overall
 monetary loss would be slightly smaller. In the extreme case where we assume principals exert zero effort in the
 counterfactual, the monetary loss would amount to 27 percent.
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 Table 4—Realized Profits and Predicted Equilibrium Profits for Agents
 Principal has control
 Observations
 Agent has control
 Observations Actual  Predicted  Actual  Predicted
 PLOW  23 0***  25.6  251  18.8**  23.3  49
 LOW  16.1**  17.3  310  17.9  20.1  50
 HIGH  2i o***  24.0  316  20.1***  23.3  174
 PHIGH  15 9**  17.2  172  18.1**  20.1  128
 Notes: Significance levels calculated by regressing earnings on a constant and testing whether the constant is equal
 to the prediction. Errors clustered at the individual level.
 ***Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
 * Significant at the 10 percent level.
 B. Exploring the Principals' Reluctance to Delegate
 Pecuniary Motivations.—A natural initial hypothesis for the observed under
 delegation of authority in the HIGH and PHIGH treatments is that individuals
 believe that they are monetarily better off retaining authority. To see whether this
 hypothesis has merit, we consider the following counterfactual: suppose that a prin
 cipal who did not delegate would elect to delegate instead. Given her beliefs about
 the agent's actions if she keeps control and if she delegates control, what would be
 her gain or loss in expected earnings?
 As the effort of the principal was elicited only in the case of her chosen authority
 allocation, a comparison of the principal's expected earnings for the cases of delega
 tion and nondelegation requires assumptions about her effort in the counterfactual
 authority allocation. As we have the principals' beliefs about the agents' effort from
 both the delegation case and nondelegation case, a natural approach is to use the
 principal's best reply effort as a proxy for effort. If, for example, the principal kept
 authority we can compute the principal's best reply effort for the case in which the
 principal had delegated authority. Using this effort proxy and the principal's belief
 about the agent's effort enables us to compute the principal's expected profit for the
 counterfactual case of delegation.19
 As a comparison value, we next compute the expected profits of the principal
 for the case of retained authority, taking the principal's actual effort and his beliefs
 about the agent's effort into account.20 Subtracting the expected profit from retained
 authority from the expected profit from delegation yields our first measure for the
 expected gains from delegation.
 Figure 4 shows the cumulative density function of the gains from delegating under
 the assumption that the principal would have played a best reply in case he had
 19Under the assumption that the principal best replies to his beliefs, the expected earnings for the counterfactual
 case of delegation is given by
 EVdP(Ed = r"p{êd),êd) = edP2 + (1 - êd)rdP{êd)P, + J»„ - gp(rdp(êd)),
 where êd is the principal's belief about the agent's effort under delegation, P0 is the principal's payout under the out
 side option, P2 is the principal's payment under the agent's preferred project net of P0, /, is the principal's payment
 under the principal's preferred project net of P0, and rP(êd) is the best response function constructed in equation (9).
 20This comparison value is given by
 EVP(EJ) = EPI + (1 - E)êP2 + P0- gp{E).
This content downloaded from 134.21.139.233 on Mon, 19 Feb 2018 10:56:33 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 VOL 103 NO. 4 FEHR ET AL. . LURE OF AUTHORITY 1343
 Expected gain/loss from switching from kept authority to
 delegating authority and best responding to beliefs
 Figure 4. Cumulative Density Function of Expected Gain from Delegation
 if Principal Best Replies to Beliefs
 delegated. As can be seen in this graph by looking at the mass to the right of the zero
 line, 68 percent of observations in the HIGH treatment and 92 percent of observa
 tions from the PHIGH treatment are from individuals who would have been better
 off if they had delegated. The retention of authority in the PHIGH treatment is espe
 cially noteworthy since both the principal and the agent would be made better off
 through delegation. Thus, in this treatment, the underdelegation is suboptimal not
 only from the principals' perspective, but also from the perspective of the organiza
 tion as a whole.
 One might worry that using the best response to beliefs as a proxy for effort might
 overstate the expected return to delegation. Perhaps some individuals may not per
 fectly best respond to their beliefs.
 As a conservative secondary measure for the expected gains from delegation, we
 next consider the case where the principal provides zero effort after delegation. This
 criterion is selected for three reasons. First, an individual who puts in zero effort has
 no potential losses and minimal exposure to risk. Relative to the actual strategies
 typically employed by principals, the zero effort criterion should thus be an attrac
 tive strategy for principals who are extremely risk or loss averse. Second, besides
 very high effort choices which are observed very infrequently, zero effort minimizes
 the expected value of delegation, giving us the lowest reasonable expected value of
 delegation. Finally, zero effort is, in fact, the modal strategy taken after delegation,
 suggesting it is a relevant benchmark for analysis.
 In Figure 5 we depict the cumulative density function for the expected gains
 from delegation under the assumption that the principal would have chosen zero
 effort if he had delegated. We find that 46.8 percent of observations in the HIGH
 treatment and 75 percent of observations in the PHIGH treatment are from individ
 uals who would have been better off in case of delegation. This result is remarkable
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 Figure 5. Cumulative Density Function of Expected Gain from Delegation
 if Principal Chooses Zero Effort after Delegation
 because even if we assume that principals choose highly suboptimal effort levels
 after delegation, it would have often been better for them (given their beliefs) to
 delegate authority.
 One might also be concerned that the underdelegation effect is due to having
 a limited number of periods in which to learn the optimal delegation strategy.
 Perhaps underdelegation is a consequence of incomplete learning in our ten
 period experiments.
 In order to study this hypothesis, we ran an additional treatment (PHIGH50) in
 which we increased the number of periods to 50 and increased the equilibrium returns
 to delegation from 10 percent (in the PHIGH treatment) to 17 percent. As with the
 original PHIGH treatment, we use an asymmetric design in which the agent's pay
 ment for his preferred project is much higher than his payment under the principal's
 preferred project, and where both the principal and agent would benefit highly from
 delegation at the equilibrium effort levels.21 To further facilitate learning we also
 simplified the design by making the subordinate's recommendation automatic, i.e.,
 the controlling party knew with certainty that an informed subordinate would rec
 ommend his preferred project, while an uninformed subordinate would recommend
 the outside option.
 Figure 6 shows the time path of delegation decisions in this treatment. As can
 be seen, while there is an increase in delegation in the first 25 periods, delegation
 21 In the PHIGH50 treatment, the payment for the principal and agent under the principal's preferred project
 were 45 and 20, respectively. Under the agent's preferred project, the payments were 40 (for the principal) and 45
 (for the agent). Equilibrium payoffs were 31 points for the principal and 23.1 points for the agent if the agent had
 control, and 26.5 points for the principal and 18.1 points for the agent if the principal had control. We randomly paid
 20 of the 50 periods at the end of the experiment. 64 subjects participated in two sessions of this treatment, and the
 average session time of this experiment was 2.5 hours with an average payment of 72 CHF ($75).
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 Figure 6. Average Delegation Frequencies of Principals in the PHIGH50 Treatment
 Notes: Period averages shown by the diamonds, quadratic time trend shown by the solid line. In total, 32 principals
 participated in these 50-period experiments.
 rates remain fairly constant in the remaining 25 periods. Of the 32 principals in the
 treatment, 43.8 percent never switched their delegation decision after period 25.
 Subjects are also on average fairly persistent in their delegation choice. On the
 basis of a median split, we find that those who predominantly keep authority del
 egate in only 11 percent of the cases in the second half of this treatment. Those
 who predominantly delegate authority keep it in only 12.5 percent of the cases in
 the second half of this treatment. Overall, the delegation rate is 8 percent higher in the
 second half of this treatment compared to the second half of the PHIGH treatment,
 but this is what one would expect because of the increased incentives to delegate
 in the PHIGH50 treatment. The overall delegation rates in PHIGH50 are, however,
 still well below the level predicted by theory, with an average delegation rate of
 56.5 percent in the last 25 periods of the experiment. As in the PHIGH treatment,
 this large amount of underdelegation occurred despite the fact that both the princi
 pals and the agents were substantially better off in cases where decision rights were
 delegated relative to cases where decision rights were held.
 Nonpecuniary Motivations.—The results above suggest that many principals had
 strong pecuniary incentives to delegate. They further suggest that a large portion
 of underdelegation is not due to incomplete learning. Why then do we observe this
 strong reluctance to delegate?
 One nonpecuniary force behind the principals' choices appears to be a disutility
 from being overruled. Recall that the principal's return from the agent's preferred
 project is the same regardless of whether the principal is informed or uninformed.
 Thus, for a principal who has delegated and faces an agent who selects his pre
 ferred project, the pecuniary value of being informed and uninformed is the same.
 Conditional on effort, an expected utility maximizing principal in the subordinate
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 Table 5—Delegation Conditional on Previous Experience
 (1)  (2)  (3)
 Principal informed in t — 1  0.170  0.194*  0.191
 (0.120)  (0.110)  (0.129)
 Agent informed in t — 1  0.208 ***  0.189***  0.122**
 (0.062)  (0.061)  (0.059)
 Overruled in ; — 1  -0.371 **  -0.410***  -0.323 **
 (0.153)  (0.149)  (0.159)
 Effort in t - 1  -0.004 **  -0.005  -0.002
 (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002)
 Treatment controls?  Yes  Yes  Yes
 Belief and time controls?  No  Yes  Yes
 Pseudo R2  0.170  0.249  0.199
 Observations  360  360  271
 Notes: Marginal effects from a probit regression are reported in the table. Standard errors in parentheses, clus
 tered by individual. Sample is restricted to principals who delegated in t — 1. The omitted category is the case in
 which both the principal and agent are uninformed. Regressions (1) and (2) contain the data from all treatments.
 Regression (3) contains only data from the HIGH and PHIGH treatments, where delegation is predicted. Belief con
 trols are beliefs of principals under both authority allocations. Time controls are period fixed effects.
 ♦ ♦♦Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ♦♦Significant at the 5 percent level.
 * Significant at the 10 percent level.
 position should be indifferent between the case where she is informed and overruled
 by the agent and where she remains uninformed. Thus, her response to being over
 ruled and receiving the payoff from the agent's preferred project should be identical
 to her response to being uninformed and receiving the payoff of the agent's pre
 ferred project. However, if a principal experiences a nonpecuniary disutility from
 being overruled, her response to these two outcomes may differ: In the next period,
 the principal may correctly anticipate the potential disutility from being overruled
 and, therefore, she may be less willing to delegate.
 To examine spillovers across periods, we take the principals who delegate in
 period t — 1 and regress the probability of delegating in period t on the information
 the principal and agent received in the previous period. To account for potential
 differences in effort and beliefs, we also condition on the effort of the principal in
 the previous period and the beliefs the principal has about the agent's action in the
 current period.
 Table 5 reports the marginal effects of this regression for various subsets of our
 data. The omitted category in all regressions is the case in which both the prin
 cipal and the agent are uninformed. As can be seen in column 1, the principal is
 more likely to delegate in period t if either she was informed in t — 1 or the agent
 was informed in t — 1. However, when both the principal and agent were informed
 in t — 1 and the principal was overruled by the agent, her delegation probability
 falls to the same level that also prevails if both were uninformed in the previous
 period, i.e., when the outside option was implemented. This suggests that the prin
 cipal reacts negatively to being overruled—a behavior that cannot be explained if
 the principal maximizes the expected utility from her monetary payoffs only. The
 behavioral response to overruling is robust to specifications which include period
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 dummies and belief data (column 2), and specifications which use only the HIGH
 and PHIGH treatments where delegation is expected to take place (column 3).
 The importance of the overruling effect is also corroborated by data from questions
 in the ex post survey administered after the PHIGH50 treatments in April 2011. We
 asked participants in the role of the principal to evaluate two delegation scenarios
 in both of which they delegated and the agent's project is implemented, and which
 differ only in whether they were informed or not. On a seven-point likert scale,
 the scenario in which the principal was uninformed had an average evaluation of
 5.97, while the scenario in which the principal was informed and thus overruled
 had a lower average evaluation of 4.59. This difference is highly significant both
 in a paired /-test (p < 0.01) and in a nonparametric sign-rank test (p < 0-01).22
 Hence, even though the monetary outcome is identical across both scenarios, prin
 cipals on average assigned significantly lower value to the scenario in which they
 were overruled.
 We performed another test of the hypothesis that the nonpecuniary disutility
 of being overruled causes a reluctance to delegate by conducting two additional
 25-period treatments which had nearly identical equilibrium returns to delegation
 but varied in the extent to which overruling was possible. The first of these treatments
 restricted the subordinate's effort to zero and did not allow him to make recommen
 dations. This treatment was symmetric with a payment of 40 if the own preferred
 project was chosen and 30 if the other party's preferred project was chosen. We
 refer to this treatment as HIGH NOREC. There are relatively high (15.8 percent)
 equilibrium returns to delegation since the commitment not to exert effort as the
 subordinate increases the effort exerted by the controlling party. We compare these
 data to a 25-period version of the PHIGH50 treatment (PHIGH25) which had simi
 lar equilibrium returns to delegation.23
 Recall that the difference between the HIGH NOREC and the PHIGH25 treat
 ment is that in the former the principals cannot be overruled. Therefore, if the
 principals derive disutility from being overruled they should be more willing to
 delegate in HIGH NOREC. We find indeed that the average delegation rate of the
 HIGH NOREC treatment was higher (67.1 percent) than in the PHIGH25 treat
 ment (41.3 percent)—a difference that is statistically significant (p = 0.011).24 The
 higher delegation rate in HIGH NOREC occurred despite the fact that the empirical
 return on delegation is 21 percentage points higher in the PHIGH25 treatment than
 in HIGH NOREC. For this reason, the higher delegation rates in HIGH NOREC
 provide additional support for the hypothesis that being overruled is associated
 with disutility.
 What is the source of this disutility? A plausible answer to this question is pro
 vided by the notion of regret aversion (which we formalize in online Appendix A). To
 examine the role of regret aversion in our setting it is useful to recall that the princi
 pals chose considerably higher effort in the role of the controlling party compared to
 22 The two survey questions were randomly ordered and asked on separate screens of the exit survey.
 23The 25-period experiments lasted on average 1.75 hours, 32 subjects participated in the PHIGH25 treatment,
 and 28 subjects participated in the HIGH NOREC treatment. Pooling earnings across the treatments, subjects
 earned 44 CHF ($47) on average.
 24This p-value is calculated using a probit regression controlling for period fixed effects. Standard errors are
 clustered by the individual.
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 when they were the subordinate party. Therefore, if the principals in the subordinate
 role became informed about which project was best for them they knew that they
 would also have been informed if they had kept the decision right. In other words,
 they could have chosen their best project if they had kept their decision right. It is
 thus quite plausible that the principals regretted their delegation decision when they
 were informed and the agent's preferred project was implemented. If this regret is
 psychologically aversive the delegation option becomes less valuable. This account
 of underdelegation in terms of regret aversion can explain the following four facts:
 (i) the underdelegation of authority in the HIGH and the PHIGH treatment; (ii) the
 sharp reduction in delegation rates after being overruled; (iii) the subjects' prefer
 ence (in the postexperimental survey) for being not informed about their best project
 when the agent's preferred project is implemented anyway; and (iv) the much higher
 delegation rate when the experimental design rules out ex post regret by preventing
 the principal from providing effort after delegation.
 Our explanation of underdelegation in terms of regret aversion would receive
 further support if an individual measure of regret aversion would predict individ
 ual differences in the reluctance to delegate. Subjects' behavior in the lottery task
 described in Section IIB may be interpreted as such an individual difference mea
 sure. If the subjects' reluctance to accept the lotteries is at least partly driven by
 subjects' regret aversion, the propensity to reject lotteries should also predict the
 reluctance to delegate (in the treatments where overruling can occur). This is, in fact,
 what we observe. In online Appendix C (Table C3) we report probit regressions of
 principals' delegation choices with treatment conditions, period fixed effects, prin
 cipals' beliefs about agents' effort and the number of rejected lotteries as explana
 tory variables. Individuals in the HIGH and PHIGH treatments are 12 percent less
 likely to delegate for each gamble in the lottery task that they decline (p = 0.021).
 If we combine the observations in the HIGH and PHIGH treatment and split the
 sample at median lottery acceptance, the difference in delegation frequency between
 the group which accepts more gambles and the group which accepts fewer gambles
 is 20 percent. These findings further support the view that regret aversion appears to
 be an important motive behind the reluctance to delegate authority. The next subsec
 tions will show that the same motive may also partly explain the controlling and the
 subordinate parties' effort choices.
 C. Exploring the Controlling Parties' Overprovision of Effort
 We saw in Figure 3 that the provision of effort by the controlling party exceeds the
 Nash equilibrium prediction across all treatments, while the effort of the subordinate
 is below the Nash prediction. These deviations are persistent, with no convergence
 to the Nash equilibrium over time.25
 Persistent deviations from the Nash equilibrium might be due to one of two sources.
 First, for a given belief about the other party's effort, an individual may respond to
 those beliefs differently than the best reply. For example, if the controlling party
 25 Looking at agents' effort in the first five periods and the last five periods of the four main treatments, average
 effort declines by 2.4 points as a subordinate (p = 0.014 if effort is regressed on a dummy for periods 6-10) and
 decreases by 0.2 points as controlling party (p = 0.76).
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 systematically overprovides effort relative to the best reply, his or her effort is likely
 to be higher than the Nash equilibrium effort. Likewise, if the subordinate party
 underprovides effort relative to the best reply, then the effort is likely to be lower
 than the Nash equilibrium effort.
 Second, beliefs about the other party's effort provision may deviate from those
 predicted in the Nash equilibrium. Because of strategic substitutability, a controlling
 party whose beliefs about subordinate effort are below those predicted by the Nash
 equilibrium will increase his or her effort relative to the Nash equilibrium. Likewise,
 a subordinate party whose beliefs are above the Nash equilibrium will decrease
 effort in substitution. In this section we examine both the best reply channel and the
 belief channel as potential sources of the controlling parties' overprovision of effort.
 We first look at systematic deviations from the best response function by con
 structing the theoretical best response for the controlling party if control is kept and
 if control is delegated under the assumption of risk neutrality:
 By comparing these best responses with the actual response of controlling parties to
 their beliefs, we can examine systematic deviations from the best response function.
 Figure 7 shows this comparison pooled for all treatments. The dashed 45° line
 represents those cases where the actual response to beliefs coincides with the best
 response to these beliefs. Points above the 45° line represent observations in which
 the controlling party overprovides relative to the best response, while points below
 the 45° line represent an underprovision of effort.
 The solid line in Figure 7 shows the empirical relationship between the actual
 response to beliefs about the subordinates' effort and the best response. The positive
 slope of this line indicates that the best response has some (qualitative) predictive
 power. However, the overwhelming feature in the data is the systematic over
 provision of effort by the controlling party relative to the best response. Counting
 all observations strictly above the 45° line, 66 percent of observations for principals
 and 77 percent of observations for agents provide more effort than is predicted by a
 best response to beliefs. The magnitude of this overprovision is typically large, with
 48 percent of observations 15 points or more above prediction.
 While Figure 7 shows the combined data across all treatments, the pattern doesn't
 vary qualitatively across treatments. Table 6 shows the average effort of the control
 ling party and the corresponding average of the best response to beliefs. As can be
 seen, effort provision of the controlling party is above the average best response
 prediction in all treatments and for both authority allocations, and in seven of these
 eight cases the difference is significant.26
 (12)
 26Technically, the effort provisions of individuals within a matching group may be correlated due to shared
 histories. However, as the information concerning the actions of others in the matching group is limited, we expect
 the effect of heterogeneous learning to be limited. As an additional control, we ran matching group-clustered ver
 sions of each sign-rank and rank-sum test included in this article to check whether matching group-level effects
 are driving our results. As expected, the p-values of these tests are slightly higher but have a minor effect on the
 significance levels reported throughout the paper. See Datta and Satten (2008) and Datta and Satten (2005) for
 details of the two tests.
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 Figure 7. Controlling Party: Actual Effort versus Best Response to Beliefs
 ( Combined data from all main treatments)
 Table 6—Comparison of Effort Provision of the Controlling Party to the Best
 Response to Beliefs
 Principal has control Agent has control
 Actual  Best response  Actual  Best response
 effort  effort  effort  effort
 PLOW  55.7  53.9  68.1***  49.1
 LOW  66.1***  54.5  68.3***  55.8
 HIGH  48.2***  42.1  58.7***  45.3
 PHIGH  58.2**  45.9  65.1**  56.2
 Note: Significance levels calculated using a signed-rank test with beliefs and effort averaged
 by individual prior to estimation.
 *** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
 ♦Significant at the 10 percent level.
 Based on this data, we conclude
 RESULT 5: Controlling parties overprovide effort relative to their best response to
 beliefs about the subordinate's effort.
 Result 5 suggests that having authority appears to have a motivational effect on
 the effort provision of the controlling parties. We next turn to beliefs. Since the
 efforts of the two parties are strategic substitutes, deviations from the Nash equi
 librium prediction may partially be explained by pessimistic beliefs of controlling
 parties.
 Table 7 compares actual beliefs to the Nash equilibrium beliefs for all treatments
 and both authority allocations. As can be seen by comparing the first two columns,
 the principal's belief about agent effort if control is kept is comparable to the Nash
 equilibrium prediction. In fact, in three out of four cases (i.e., in PLOW, LOW,
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 Table 7—Comparison of Actual Beliefs of the Controlling Party
 to the Nash Prediction
 Principal has control  Agent has control
 Nash  Actual  Nash  Actual
 prediction  belief  prediction  belief
 PLOW  25  30.4  35***  21.8
 LOW  25  27.5  25*  20.9
 HIGH  35  35.8  35*  29.4
 PHIGH  35*  28.2  25**  19.0
 Note: Significance levels calculated using a signed-rank test with beliefs and effort averaged
 by individual prior to estimation.
 *** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 "Significant at the 5 percent level.
 *Significant at the 10 percent level.
 and HIGH) the principals' effort expectation is above eNE, but the deviation is not
 significant. Thus, pessimistic beliefs of the principal cannot contribute to the over
 provision of effort in these cases. The situation is somewhat different if authority
 was delegated. Here, the controlling party (the agents) expected in all four treat
 ments that the subordinate party will underprovide effort relative to the Nash equi
 librium. Thus, beliefs of the agents do account for some of the overprovision of
 effort relative to the Nash equilibrium prediction.27
 D. Exploring the Subordinate Parties' Underprovision of Effort
 We next examine possible reasons for deviations from the Nash equilibrium on
 the part of the subordinates. We will again examine the role of beliefs as well as the
 role of systematic deviations from the best response function as potential sources of
 the observed deviation of effort relative to the Nash equilibrium.
 Figure 8 shows the relationship between the theoretical best response and the
 actual response function for the subordinates. As before, the 45° line represents
 the predicted best response function of the subordinate in response to beliefs about the
 effort of the controlling party, while the solid line shows the empirical best response
 behavior from a simple linear regression. Points above the 45° line represent observa
 tions in which the subordinate overprovides effort relative to the best response, while
 points below the 45° line represent an underprovision of effort.
 As can be seen in the left-hand panel of the figure, the actual response function
 is positively sloped but relatively flat, suggesting a relatively weak effort response
 to beliefs. Unlike the controlling parties' efforts, which were clustered above the
 best response correspondence, effort provisions by subordinates are heterogeneous:
 52 percent of individual choices are below the best response to beliefs for agents,
 while 56 percent of individual choices are below the best response to beliefs for
 principals. In addition, a large number of individual choices are considerably below
 the best response.
 27 Table C4 in online Appendix C shows that beliefs of controlling parties about subordinate effort do, on aver
 age, exceed actual subordinate effort.
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 Figure 8. Subordinates: Actual Effort versus Best Response to Beliefs
 (Combined data from all main treatments)
 A particularly salient fact in Figure 8 is that a large number of subordinates put
 in zero effort, i.e., lack of control appears to have a strong demotivational effect for
 a large minority. Recall that the cost of effort is convex with the cost of increasing
 effort from zero to five equaling gP(5) - gP(0) = 0.06 points. Since incremental
 effort is nearly costless, zero effort is predicted only in cases where the subordinate
 believes in an effort of 100 by the controlling party, which almost never occurred.
 The heterogeneous behavior of subordinates also appears to be a robust phenom
 enon at the treatment level. Table 8 reports the average effort of the subordinate, the
 average theoretical best response to beliefs, and the proportion of individuals who
 provide zero effort for each treatment and for principals and agents separately. As
 can be seen by comparing the first two columns of each treatment, there is little dif
 ference between the actual effort and the theoretical best response to beliefs at the
 mean. The similarity in these two averages reflects the heterogeneous nature of sub
 ordinate effort provision where both under- and overprovision of effort is observed.
 Looking at the third column of each row, it is apparent that zero effort is a modal
 strategy for the subordinates in all treatments. Zero effort is observed at least 25 per
 cent of the time in all eight cases, and in three of these cases, zero effort accounts
 for roughly 50 percent of the observations.28 The high frequency of observed zeroes
 28 One possible explanation for zero effort is that individuals who exert zero effort simply don't understand the
 environment. In studying the effort that agents exert as the controlling party, however, this explanation is unlikely.
 Remember that we collect effort choices of agents in both roles, the subordinate and the controlling party. We can
 therefore direcdy compare whether those subjects who exert zero effort as subordinates are different from those
 who do not when in the controlling party role. A regression of controlling party effort on a dummy that takes on the
 value 1 if subordinate effort is zero, controlling for treatment and clustering standard errors at the individual level,
 reveals that those agents who chose zero effort as subordinates on average exert three units of additional effort (this
 difference is not significant (p = 0.35)). In fact, as will be discussed later in Section HIE, a positive difference is
 to be expected if regret aversion directly affects effort choices. This suggests that a lack of understanding is not the
 driver of zero effort choices.
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 Table 8—Comparison of Effort of Subordinates to Their Best Response to Beliefs
 Agents in subordinate role Principals in subordinate role
 Actual  Best response  Percent  Actual  Best response  Percent
 effort  to beliefs  zero  effort  to beliefs  zero
 PLOW  22.8  21.1  39.0  16.5  24.2  36.7
 LOW  14.3**  19.8  49.4  16.2  18.9  54.0
 HIGH  26.5  24.6  28.5  19.6  26.3  36.8
 PHIGH  17.3  18.4  50.3  20.7  22.6  36.7
 Note: Significance levels calculated using a signed-rank test with beliefs and effort averaged by individual prior to
 estimation.
 ***Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
 * Significant at the 10 percent level.
 is due in large part to a subset of individuals who always exert zero effort in the
 subordinate role.29
 Based on these observations, we conclude
 RESULT 6: The subordinates' effort behavior is heterogeneous. While on average
 effort provision is close to the theoretical best response, there is a large group of
 subordinates who provide zero effort, far below the optimal best response. For this
 group, authority appears to have a strong demotivational effect. In addition, there is
 a smaller group of subordinates who systematically overprovide effort.
 Turning to beliefs, Table 9 shows the beliefs of the subordinate compared to the
 Nash equilibrium. As can be seen, agents and principals have optimistic beliefs
 relative to the Nash equilibrium. As optimistic beliefs are expected to lead to a
 decrease in effort, beliefs may be contributing to the underprovision of effort by
 the agent and the principals. However, as we noted in Figure 8, the actual response
 function is much flatter than would be predicted by the best response. Whereas
 theory would predict that effort increases by six points when beliefs fall by ten
 points, the actual response to beliefs is significantly smaller. For agents, a ten-point
 reduction in beliefs about the controlling parties' effort leads to only a 1.6-point
 increase in effort.30
 E. The Motivational and Demotivational Forces of Authority :
 Nonpecuniary Explanations
 Thus far we have seen that for both the controlling party and the subordinate,
 deviations from best response behavior account for much of the observed departure
 from the Nash predictions. A significant proportion of controlling parties provide
 29 Between 18 and 33 percent of agents exert zero effort in nine or ten periods. Between 8 and 50 percent of
 principals who delegated at least once exerted zero effort after each delegation.
 30For principals, effort increases by 3.8 points when beliefs fall by ten points. Both coefficients are significantly
 smaller than the theoretically expected six-point increase (p < 0.01) in a simple regression of effort on beliefs.
 Table C4 in online Appendix C reports beliefs about controlling party effort in comparison to actual controlling
 party effort choices.
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 Table 9—Comparison of Actual Beliefs of Subordinates
 to the Nash Prediction
 Agents in subordinate role  Principals in subordinate role
 Nash Actual Nash Actual
 prediction belief prediction belief
 PLOW 55*** 64.8 45*** 59.8
 LOW 55*** 66.9 55*** 68.4
 HIGH 45*** 59.0 45*** 56.2
 PHIGH 45** 69.3 55*** 62.3
 Note: Significance levels calculated using a signed-rank test with beliefs and effort averaged
 by individual prior to estimation.
 ♦"Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
 ♦Significant at the 10 percent level.
 effort which exceeds the best response function, leading to effort levels higher than
 predicted. Similarly, a significant proportion of subordinates provide zero effort
 despite the almost negligible cost of providing incremental effort. Having estab
 lished these observational facts, the question remains which behavioral force shows
 promise in rationalizing our data.
 As we saw in the delegation section, many aspects of our data support the inter
 pretation that regret aversion is an important force behind the underdelegation of
 authority. Might the same behavioral force also have promise to rationalize the
 observed deviations in effort choices?
 To begin our analysis, we take the same overruling effect which was found to
 be of importance in delegation and ask to what extent it can explain the effort pat
 terns of a subordinate. Recall that as a subordinate there is the potential of being
 overruled. If such overruling generates nonpecuniary losses—as predicted by regret
 aversion—a subordinate who anticipates this disutility may reduce effort, thereby
 reducing the probability with which overruling occurs (see online Appendix A for
 more details). For cases where this nonpecuniary loss is particularly strong, effort
 provision in the subordinate role may be driven to zero.
 The explanation that zero effort is a response to anticipatory regret would receive
 support if our individual measure of regret aversion would correlate with individual
 differences in zero effort. Our interpretation is supported in precisely this way: in a
 probit regression, the probability that a subordinate exerts zero effort increases by
 5.9 percent per additional gamble rejected (p = 0.030).31
 Regret in the domain of effort choices may also result in an overprovision of effort
 by the controlling party if there is a nonpecuniary disutility for being unsuccessful
 in implementing one's own preferred project. Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay (2007) have
 shown that individuals who lose in first price sealed bid auctions to bids which are
 below their true valuation behave as if they experience "loser regret," i.e., these
 individuals behave as if they suffer a disutility from losing when they could have
 31A dummy variable is created that takes on the value 1 in case of zero effort provision in the role of the subordi
 nate. Data from the four main treatments is included in this regression. The probit regression also contains controls
 for the treatment, being in the role of the agent, interactions of role and treatment, controls for beliefs, and period
 dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
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 won, and earned profit, by making a higher bid. In our setting, the controlling party
 may, hence, regret his or her effort choice in cases where it remains uninformed
 and thus could have improved the project selection by putting in more effort. An
 individual in the role of the controlling party who anticipates such regret optimally
 raises his or her effort (see online Appendix A for more details). Again, we can test
 this conjecture by using regression analysis and looking at the correlation between
 overprovision of effort and our individual measure of regret aversion. In a probit
 regression, we find that the probability of overprovision increases by 4.5 percent per
 additional gamble rejected (p = 0.058).32 Thus, taken together, regret aversion may
 be a driving force behind all three major experimental patterns—the underdelega
 tion of authority, the high frequency of zero effort choices among subordinates, and
 the overprovision of effort by the controlling parties.33
 While regret aversion shows promise in rationalizing our data, it is reasonable to ask
 whether alternative hypotheses show similar promise. Could it be, for example, that
 the agents' effort choices are influenced by reciprocity or other forms of social pref
 erences? Or, may risk or loss aversion generate a similar pattern to regret aversion?
 A common reason for deviations from standard economic predictions is the exis
 tence of social preferences. In our setting, if agents view the delegation of authority as
 a kind act they may overprovide effort because of reciprocal motivations. Likewise, if
 they view a lack of delegation as an unkind act they may underprovide effort relative to
 their best response. Thus, positive and negative reciprocity may, in principle, explain
 the agents' effort pattern. We tested for the impact of reciprocity motives by conduct
 ing an additional treatment in the HIGH condition in which the delegation decision
 was decided exogenously by the computer. In this HIGH RAND treatment, a virtual
 coin is flipped each period which determines whether control rights are kept by the
 principal or whether the principal is forced to delegate them. Since the agents know that
 the principals are forced to make a choice it is impossible to attribute kind or unkind
 intentions to the principal. If positive or negative reciprocity play a role, the agents'
 effort choices in the HIGH RAND condition will deviate from their choices in the
 HIGH condition. However, neither as a controlling party (Kolmogorov Smirnov test,
 p = 0.20) nor in the position of the subordinate party (Kolmogorov Smirnov
 test, p = 0.99) do the agents' effort choices differ in the two conditions, implying that
 reciprocity is unlikely to explain their effort pattern.
 In all of our treatments, the controlling party overprovides effort relative to her
 best response which directly increases the expected earnings of the subordinate.
 Thus, altruism on the part of the controlling parties could explain this pattern of
 effort. To control for this possibility we implemented an additional control treatment
 with the following features. Only one of the two subjects was given the ability to
 32 A dummy variable is created that takes on the value 1 if a subject overprovided effort in the role of the control
 ling party on average. Data from the four main treatments are included in this regression. The regression also con
 tains controls for the treatment, being in the role of the agent, and interactions of role and treatment. Each individual
 in our dataset who chose effort in the controlling party role at least once is an observation.
 33 As was stated in result 6, we also observe a minority of subordinates who actually overprovide effort relative
 to their best response. In online Appendix A we show that heterogeneity in subordinate effort is also consistent with
 a model with both loser regret and overrule regret. Recall that the role of controlling party is influenced only by
 loser regret, and therefore individuals are predicted to exert effort above the Nash equilibrium in this role. As the
 subordinate, an individual is exposed both to the potential of being overruled and to the potential of loser regret.
 These forces go in opposite directions, and the response in effort will therefore depend on an individual's inclination
 toward both types of regret.
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 provide effort and to choose the project, but both parties were paid based on the
 controlling party's project choice. Thus, in this treatment the passive party never
 receives the decision right and never makes an effort choice but only collects her
 payoffs. We compare this treatment with the single player game (described at the
 beginning of Section IIC) which is identical to the above control treatment except
 that no passive recipient exists. Thus in the additional control treatment social pref
 erences can affect the active subject's effort, while in the single player game social
 preferences cannot play a role. It turns out that the effort choices of the active party
 and the single player are indistinguishable (Kolmogorov Smirnov test, p = 0.44),
 indicating that social preferences do not significantly affect effort.
 Another potential reason for deviations from theoretical predictions is that
 the assumption of expected value maximization may be violated due to loss
 aversion. In the online Appendix D, we show that loss aversion with a refer
 ence point at the outside option cannot explain the overprovision of effort by
 the controlling parties. The intuitive reason for this claim is as follows. For
 loss averse individuals, an increase in effort above the risk neutral optimum
 increases the magnitude of a potential loss which reduces utility. This follows
 from the fact that an increase in effort causes a sure increase in costs, but as
 long as the possibility of success is below 1 the controlling parties' ex post
 payoff from unsuccessful search may not cover the effort cost. Thus, for rea
 sonable amounts of loss aversion, optimal effort is decreasing in an individual's
 degree of loss aversion. For unrealistically extreme levels of loss aversion, an
 individual may prefer to guarantee a payoff rather than playing any lottery. For
 controlling parties with such extreme levels of loss aversion, providing maxi
 mal effort (which guarantees a payoff of 15) may be preferable to providing
 low effort and hoping for success by the subordinate. In these cases, loss aver
 sion would predict a maximal effort level of 100.
 Looking at both cases in combination, loss aversion cannot explain effort levels
 which are above the best response function but below an effort level of 100. As these
 are the observations which need to be rationalized in order to explain the overprovi
 sion of effort by the controlling parties, loss aversion cannot explain our effort results.
 In online Appendix E, we show that similar to loss aversion, neither risk aversion
 nor risk loving preferences can account for overprovision of effort by the control
 ling party. Moreover, neither risk nor loss aversion can explain the subordinates'
 choice of zero effort levels, because effort costs are negligible at low effort levels.
 For example, assuming risk aversion, beliefs about controlling party effort need to
 be extremely high to rationalize a subordinate's effort choice of zero. Using a CRRA
 utility specification of the following form, U(x) = an effort of 0 is predicted
 only if the belief in controlling party effort is 100 (up to a = 8). Hence, only for
 counterfactually high beliefs (or unrealistically extreme levels of risk aversion) is
 zero effort expected to occur.
 IV. Conclusion
 Authority and power permeate political, social, and economic interactions. It
 is therefore important to understand their motivation and incentive effects. In this
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 article we tackle this question by using a novel experimental design. We find a strong
 behavioral bias among principals to retain authority against their pecuniary interests
 and often to the disadvantage of both the principal and the agent. We demonstrate
 that underdelegation cannot be attributed to principals' beliefs nor incomplete learn
 ing, and that the individual and aggregate income losses of this delegation bias are
 substantial. Our results suggest that authority has nonpecuniary consequences that
 inhibit the reallocation of authority.
 Our results also show that authority has effects on the motivation to provide
 effort that are not captured by the theoretical model. The fundamental trade
 off between incentives and control, as modeled by Aghion and Tirole (1997),
 indeed exists; relative to the first-best the subordinate provides too little effort,
 and the controlling party provides too much. Further, the comparative statics
 between treatments are well met. However, the inefficiency generated by the
 incentive conflict is much greater than predicted by theory. The controlling
 parties provide significantly more effort, and the subordinate parties provide
 significantly less relative to the Nash equilibrium prediction. For controlling
 parties and a large fraction of subordinates, this is also true relative to the best
 response to beliefs.
 A deeper look at our data suggests that a distaste for being overruled is a sub
 stantial determinant of the desire to retain control. Principals who are overruled
 after delegation and earn the return from the agent's preferred project are less
 likely to delegate in the future relative to those who are uninformed and earn
 the very same return. This difference in delegation behavior—driven by informa
 tional states and not by pecuniary payoffs—suggests that individuals are suffer
 ing a nonpecuniary disutility from being overruled. One potential source of such
 nonpecuniary disutility is regret, a theory which can also help to explain the high
 frequency of zero effort among subordinates and the overprovision of effort by the
 controlling parties.
 Given the importance of authority and power in the functioning of economic and
 political organizations we believe that the motivational biases revealed by our data
 should receive more attention. In addition, further explorations into the motives
 behind delegation and control are suggested by our data. Although a significant part
 of underdelegation can be explained by principals' regret aversion we also observed
 a nonnegligible underdelegation in the treatment HIGH NOREC, where the princi
 pals' recommendation could not be overruled after delegation. This raises the ques
 tion whether some subjects intrinsically prefer to be the controlling rather than the
 subordinate party. In Bartling, Fehr, and Herz (2013) it is shown that this is indeed
 the case. Moreover, it is well possible that delegation of authority is affected by the
 mechanism by which authority has been initially assigned. For example, if the pos
 session of authority is the result of prior superior performance, the principals might
 even be more reluctant to delegate compared to the random assignment of authority.
 This additional underdelegation may result from the perception of superior com
 petence, from overconfidence, or from the status gains associated with a position
 of authority. In addition, research on the cultural determinants of the sources of
 underdelegation and the motivational effects of decision rights may be interesting
 because societies seem to be quite heterogeneous with regard to how they view and
 legitimize hierarchical structures.
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